TOPIC:

Has anyone any idea where I can find these online? I am interested in Volume III in particular - the section which covers the Armoured Train Incident at Frere/Chievely.

Regards

Rory

Morning Rory,

I am not aware that these are available online but I would happily be corrected.

Best wishes
David

Thanks David - I was hopeful as they are mentioned in the official DLI history under the Train Disaster section.

Regards

Rory

Gentlemen, I don't think these are now or have every been available online.

Thanks Frank - good to see you back

Rory,

The report you are looking for appears on p. 409 of the Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence. I'm not sure it really adds anything of significance, appart from the fact that it lays the blame for the disaster firmly at the feet of Colonel Long.










[Special Account No. 3]

A force under the command of Captain Haldane, D.S.O., 2nd Bn. Gordon Highlanders, consisting of one company, 2nd Bn. Hoyal Dublin Fusiliers, one company, Durham Light Infantry, and a detachment from H.M.S. "Tartar," with a Naval gun, when reconnoitring from Estcourt in an armoured train, on the 15th November, 1899, was ambushed at Chieveley; the major part of the force surrendered, the wounded alone escaping.

The casualties before the final surrender were five killed and 45 wounded.

Captain Haldane furnished a report, dated Pretoria, 3rd January, 1900, to the Chief of the Staff, Natal Field Force, to the following effect: –

In making the armoured train expedition from Estcourt towards Chieveley, he was carrying out the verbal instructions of Colonel Long, R.A., Commanding at Estcourt. On reaching Chieveley (where he came into touch with the enemy), Captain Haldane received a telephone message from Estcourt: "Remain at Frere in observation, watching your safe retreat. Remember Chieveley station was last night occupied by enemy. Nothing occurred here yet. Do not place reliance on any reports from local residents, as they may be untrustworthy." The party accordingly retired on Frere at full steam under an artillery fire, but suddenly the three trucks which preceded the engine were derailed; one lay on the line and the train was brought to a standstill. The Boers opened fire with three 15-pr. Creusots and one Maxim, and the Naval gun was disabled. After an hour's fighting the engine forced its way past the obstructing truck (Mr. Winston Churchill assisting in this work). The cab of the engine had been filled with wounded, and as the coupling attaching the rear trucks to the engine had been smashed, and the engine itself partly disabled, Haldane ordered the engine with the wounded to move on, intending it to act as a kind of rearguard for some distance while he himself retreated with his troops. With his troops Haldane then made a run for some houses 800 yards off, hoping to make a stand there. The engine-driver increased his speed and left them, in spite of Haldane's shouting to him. As the enemy did not relax their fire, and there being absolutely no cover, Haldane's men became much scattered. Two men, about 200 yards in front of Haldane, held up white handkerchiefs, in direct disobedience of orders which had been issued. Haldane ran towards them, but at this moment the Boers seeing the handkerchiefs ceased fire and galloped among the retreating soldiers who stood in helpless uncertainty. This ended the fight, as further resistance was useless.

General Buller forwarded this report, and testified to Captain Haldane's great judgment and coolness. It was forwarded to the War Office by Lord Roberts (15th February, 1900), with a covering dispatch concurring in General Buller's remarks, and adding that, "Though armoured trains may be useful as an adjunct to the defence of a fortress, or probably against an uncivilised enemy, I regard their employment in civilised warfare for purposes of reconnaissance as distinctly dangerous to the troops occupying them, and very rarely advantageous. The information which an armoured train is sent out to acquire can, as a rule, be obtained just as accurately and with infinitely less risk by a few intelligent mounted Officers or men."

A Court of Inquiry on Captain Haldane (who had escaped from Pretoria) was held at Pietermaritzburg on the 23rd April, 1900. Captain Haldane gave evidence precisely as in his report detailed above. Some further evidence was taken.

The finding of the Court was that Captain Haldane was made a prisoner of war through the chances of war, and not through any misconduct or neglect on his part.
On this finding General Buller wrote (Ladysmith, 2nd May, 1900): – "I cannot call this a very satisfactory explanation. It appears that Captain Haldane, who had some 200 men, was taken prisoner by some 50 Boers. As the chief blame, though, must rest with Colonel Long, the Officer who sent out such a ridiculous expedition, I accept the views of the Court, and acquit Captain Haldane of misconduct or neglect".

On further reference being made to him, General Buller wrote (Lydenburg, 5th October, 1900): – "I acquit Captain Haldane of misconduct or neglect. I have also to add that since writing my remarks of the 2nd of May . . . I have had reason to believe that the force opposed to that Officer was considerably stronger than, at the time, I was led to suppose. I am of opinion that the blame for the occurrence rests entirely on Colonel Long".

Various Courts of Inquiry were held on other members of the reconnoitring party. The evidence taken confirms that given before the Court held on Captain Haldane.

The findings of the various Courts were to the effect that the men fell into the hands of the enemy through the chances of war.

R., WAR OFFICE,
29th Nov., 1902.

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